Management and performance in U.S. nursing homes by Amirkhanyan, Anna et al.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144761 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management and Performance in U.S. Nursing Homes 
 
 
Anna A. Amirkhanyan 
Associate Professor 
Department of Public Administration and Policy 
School of Public Affairs, American University 
Ward Circle Building, 324 
4400 Massachusetts Ave, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20016 
amirkhan@american.edu 
 
Kenneth J. Meier 
Distinguished Professor, Charles H. Gregory Chair in Liberal Arts, and Director of the Project 
for Equity, Representation and Governance 
Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University 
4348 TAMU 
College Station, TX 77843-4348 
kenneth-j-meier@tamu.edu 
 
Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. 
Golembiewski Professor of Public Administration and Distinguished Research Professor 
Department of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public and International Affairs 
204 Baldwin Hall 
The University of Georgia 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
cmsotool@uga.edu 
 
Mueen A. Dakhwe 
Program Coordinator, Brazos County Health Department 
201 N Texas Ave, Bryan, TX 77803 
dr.mueendakhwe@gmail.com  
 
Shawn Janzen 
5415 Connecticut Ave NW Unit 631, Washington, DC 20015 
shawn@janzengroup.net  
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144761 
2 
 
 
 
Management and Performance in U.S. Nursing Homes 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Accountability pressures have generated complex performance measurement regimes to evaluate 
and improve public or publicly-funded services.  Performance management, however, faces 
many challenges including the tradeoffs posed by numerous dimensions of performance and a 
lack of consensus on which organizational and environmental factors can improve these results. 
This study seeks to understand the effect of management and other factors on different 
dimensions and measures of performance in U.S. public, nonprofit, and for-profit nursing homes.  
Using a hybrid data set that combines archival government data on performance in nursing 
homes with a recent nursing home administrators’ survey, we find that innovative management 
significantly1 improves the quality of care. In addition, more innovation and less power sharing 
in management are associated with serving fewer Medicaid-funded clients. Significant 
differences in performance exist across public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations. These 
differences are notable across both the archival and perceptual models of performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Throughout the paper, the term “significance” refers exclusively to “statistical significance.”  
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Management and Performance in U.S. Nursing Homes 
INTRODUCTION 
Organizational performance is an increasingly global concern for public administration 
scholars and practitioners (Boyne, Meier, O’Toole and Walker 2006; O’Toole and Meier 2011; 
Radin 2006).  Across service areas, mounting accountability pressures motivate the creation of 
complex performance measurement systems to help evaluate and improve public or publicly-
funded services (Andrews, Boyne and Walker 2006a; Heinrich 2012; Heinrich and Marshke 
2009; Selden and Sowa 2004).  Among the challenges to the use of performance data are 
tradeoffs posed by numerous dimensions of performance and a lack of consensus on which 
managerial, organizational, and environmental factors can improve these results. Related to these 
challenges, rigorous empirical research that identifies such factors is limited. The current article 
contributes to our discipline’s quest for administrative means to achieve public goals. We seek to 
understand the effect of management and other organizational and environmental factors on 
numerous dimensions and measures of performance in public, nonprofit, and for-profit 
organizations – with U.S. nursing homes as the empirical settings.  An increasingly salient public 
policy area in the U.S. due to the growth of elderly population, this field is a good example of a 
policy-specific performance measurement system, with its intergovernmental and cross-sector 
relationships, unique complexities, biases, and perverse incentives. 
This article makes several contributions to public management and health policy 
literature.  First, we focus on three broad areas of organizational management – innovation, 
sharing power, and external management. Our findings suggest a significant and positive 
association between innovation management and service quality. Innovation and power sharing 
are also significantly related to greater access to care.  Notably, after including management in 
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the analysis, public, nonprofit, and for-profit ownership remains a key factor in explaining the 
variation in nursing home quality and access. Second, our study focuses on two dimensions of 
performance – service quality and access for low-income clients – using both the archival 
indicators and the perceptual managerial assessments.  Our findings show marked differences in 
the managerial correlates of these dimensions and measures of performance. For this analysis, 
we use a hybrid2 data set that combines government data on nursing home performance from the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) with a nursing home administrators’ survey 
of internal management strategies. Third, this study contributes to the health policy and health 
care administration literature.  We find that innovation management, but not power sharing or 
external management, is associated with service quality in a health care market with fairly low 
service measurability,3 technological sophistication, dependent clientele, and extensive third-
party financing and regulation. Our results may be more generalizable to other health and human 
services, as well as to the fields of long-term care in other developed nations, where higher 
employment rates, job-related mobility, substantial retirement benefits, and prevalence of nuclear 
families create demand for institutional long-term care. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Because this study examines both the measurement of organizational performance and 
the factors associated with it, several research literatures are relevant.  They include organization 
theory, public management, and health policy. 
                                                          
2 For the purposes elaborated below, hybrid data are considered particularly useful in the public management 
literature (Boyne et al. 2006). 
3The effect of management and other factors may differ in the context of higher service measurability, i.e., with 
more observable, verifiable, and quantifiable outcomes. Similar to other human services, long term care clients’ 
improvement can be hard to measure. It is also hard to connect client outcomes to the care interventions that 
typically involve high levels of professional discretion.  Despite this, quality assessment of US nursing homes is 
fairly elaborate, capturing inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes with an extensive list of CMS measures.  
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Organizational Performance and the Sources of Data.  Defined broadly as “the 
character and consequences of service provision by public agencies,” public sector performance 
is a socially constructed and multi-dimensional phenomenon (Brewer and Selden 2000; Forbes, 
Hill and Lynn 2006, 255).  Understanding the sources of performance improvements, including 
management, is a gargantuan task for a number of reasons (Boyne 2002; Lynn, Heinrich and Hill 
2000).  Government agencies often have conflicting values and objectives, and their attainment 
involves making tradeoffs (Brewer 2006; Weiss, Bloom, and Brock 2014).  Also, many 
stakeholders are involved in the collection and use of performance data, making it difficult to 
develop a coherent picture of performance improvement (Andrews, Boyne and Walker 2006b; 
Radin 2006).  Finally, performance management goes beyond the “rational” analyses, and 
involves political, cultural, and other considerations (Eggleston and Zeckhauser 2002).   
The many objectives of government agencies are reflected in a range of dimensions of 
performance related to organizational inputs and processes (e.g., management, structures, 
resources, efficiency, or fairness), outputs (e.g., quality or timeliness), and outcomes (e.g., client 
or community impacts) (Addicott and Ferlie 2006; Boyne 2002; Forbes et al., 255).  
Understanding and accounting for this complexity requires innovative theory-building and 
rigorous research methodology – both applied to a rich set of relevant data.  Furthermore, when 
the reality is complex, the measurement can hardly be simple.  Measures that lack validity and 
reliability are of little use to practitioners (Meier and O’Toole 2013a).  The literature highlights 
an important distinction between archival and perceptual measures of performance.  Reflecting 
the managers’, staff, or clients’ views on services, perceptual measures allow comparability of 
data across services or jurisdictions.  Client surveys, in particular, are considered valid and 
relevant for public management (Shingler, Van Loon, Alter and Bridger 2008; Van Ryzin, 
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Immerwahr and Altman 2008). Perceptual measures can be problematic: they often include non-
random measurement error and are prone to positivity bias (Boyne et al. 2006).4  Perceptual 
measures can also entail common source bias, when systematic error variance is shared among 
several variables from the same source (Meier and O’Toole 2013a).5 Data from archival sources 
are developed by professionals in a standard fashion to minimize discretion and organizational 
biases.  Archival measures may fail to capture all organizational outcomes,6 and may result in 
dysfunctions – cheating, creaming, or goal displacement.  Nonetheless, archival measures are 
widely regarded as the “gold standard” of performance measurement, ranging from standardized 
tests, to agency-wide scores and societal indicators7 (O’Mahony and Stevens 2006).  Empirical 
studies across fields suggest that perceptual and archival measures of quality, quantity, or equity 
are not strongly correlated (Andrews, Boyne and Walker 2006b; Bommer et al. 1995; Brown and 
Coulter 1983; Kelly and Swindell 2002; Meier and O’Toole 2013b; Van Ryzin et al. 2008).8  
Examinations of the effect of various factors on both the perceptual and archival measures are 
scarce, and the findings are mixed (Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright 2014; Shingler et al. 
2008).  Our analysis relies on archival measures of performance reflecting the nursing homes’ 
compliance with federal regulations of the quality of life, care, administration, and physical 
environment; as well as access to care for Medicaid-funded clients.  The goal of this study is to 
investigate how performance is related to management, and various organizational and 
environmental factors (such as ownership, size, staffing, or competition). We supplement our 
                                                          
4 Meier and O’Toole (2013a) find that managers tend to report favorably on their practices and organizational 
successes, even after accounting for task difficulty or resource constraints. 
5 Thus, relationships between variables can be inflated or deflated (Meier and O’Toole 2013b).  Although there are 
better and worse ways of addressing this issue (Favero and Bullock 2015), no method is perfect. Perceptual 
measures work better if they involve narrowly defined dimensions of performance (Meier and O’Toole 2013b). 
6 Archival data may reflect judgments of powerful stakeholders on elements of performance. 
7 These include, but are not limited to, life expectancy, disease rates, or literacy. 
8 Meier and O’Toole (2013b) find correlation coefficient typically ranges between 0.2 and 0.6.  Since the shared 
variance is the square of the correlation, this suggests rather sizable differences between the two types of measures. 
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analysis with the administrators’ perceptual assessments of their facilities, to contribute to the 
literature on the antecedents of perceptual and archival performance data.9 
Management and Organizational Performance.  Public managers and policy makers can 
rarely improve outcomes directly.  Instead, they manipulate the antecedents even if there is little 
conclusive research on the determinants of performance (Boyne 2003; Forbes et al. 2006, 255).  
The sources of performance improvement are numerous: financial and human resources, 
organizational structure (e.g., centralization, size, and formalization), ownership, support by 
external stakeholders, market conditions, culture, client traits, and many others (Amirkhanyan, 
Kim and Lambright 2008; Boyne and Meier 2009; Brewer and Selden 2000; Lynn et al. 2000; 
Pandey and Moynihan 2006).  Accounting for these factors in a given field is crucial in 
understanding the main drivers of service improvements.  
Of the many internal and external factors, organizational management has emerged as an 
important point of leverage (Boyne, et al. 2006).  Studies confirm that management capacities 
and practices positively influence dimensions of organizational performance in the fields of 
human services, public education, and law enforcement (Andrews et al. 2006a; Boyne 2003; 
Brewer 2006; Moynihan 2008; Moynihan and Pandey 2005; Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole 
2004; O’Toole and Meier 2011; Selden and Sowa 2004). In public administration, the questions 
of how to conceptualize management and what its impacts are on performance are fundamentally 
important (Forbes et al. 2006, 255; Lynn et al. 2000).  Managers pursue an almost limitless 
plethora of specific activities: framing the goals, setting up internal and external structures and 
levels of supervision, motivating/incentivizing the participants, shaping cultures, building 
partnerships, complying with mandates, or adopting best practices of the field (Forbes et al. 
                                                          
9 This will provide important evidence on the propensity of subjective measures to suppress or falsely identify 
relationships with variables commonly included in organizational performance models. 
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2006: 255; Kenis 2006; Lynn et al. 2000; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999).  While it is difficult to 
account for all of these distinct, micro-level activities, many of which are specific to the service 
context, some scholars focus on the broader, overarching areas of management.  
We focus on three such broad areas. The first and second areas of management refer to 
the internal and external focus of managerial activities, respectively. Thus, managers work 
within organizations; and in managing staff and organizational processes, their approach to 
organizational governance can vary from power sharing to more centralized control. Externally, 
managers handle the environment and its influences on organizations.  The third broader area is 
innovation management. Reflecting the managers’ propensity to facilitate organizational change 
and learning by exploring new ideas and practices, it bridges the internal and external 
organizational settings.  These three areas are central to the health care and nursing home care 
context, as the literature review suggests. Below, we elaborate on the how these three broader 
areas of management are related to organizational performance.  
First, numerous influential theory-building studies in public management have focused 
on the extent of shared power while managing within organizations.  Moynihan and Pandey 
(2005) find that centralization and limited staff autonomy stifle the efforts to make positive 
changes, while shared decision-making can improve performance.  Brewer and Selden (2000) 
stress the importance of task structure – flexible management allowing the employees to make 
work-related decisions – in improving program outcomes.  According to Boyne (2003), softer 
management styles, with attention to the employees’ aspirations, rather than manipulation and 
control, may be a key source of program improvement.  Additional literature explores 
overlapping and still evolving concepts of shared, democratic, participatory, or devolved 
management styles (Gronn 2008; Harris 2008). Participatory management reflects shared 
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decision-making beyond the distribution of positional power. It improves the employees’ job 
satisfaction and sense of ownership; it also promotes efficiency, innovation, and knowledge-
sharing, and reduces ambiguity and conflict (Dearden, Carter, David, Kowalski and Surridge 
1999; Kim 2002; Oshagbemi and Gill 2003; Raelin 2012). A related concept of distributed 
leadership calls for focusing on a collective dynamic, where senior and middle managers and line 
staff all contribute to managing and leading (Fitzgerald, Ferlie, McGivern and Buchanan 2013; 
Harris 2008; Hargreaves and Fink 2008).  Shared management can be motivated by the 
administrator’s desire to gain support (Oshagbemi 2004), motivate the staff, or extend 
opportunities to participate in governance (Hargreaves and Fink 2008). In health care, distributed 
leadership enables service improvements and staff engagement (Rondeau and Wagar 2001; 
Tomlinson 2012). Nursing home managers, however, tend to prioritize state standards and 
efficiency over staff empowerment (Deutschman 2005).  
More recently, the external orientation of management has been acknowledged.  In 
today’s boundary-less context, policies are implemented in multi-organizational arrangements 
where other entities that may not be fully supportive of individual agencies’ missions (Rainey 
and Steinbauer 1999). O’Toole and Meier’s (2011) theory of public management argues that 
organizational outcomes depend on the manager’s ability to exploit and buffer the external 
influences. While attending to the productive core of their organizations, administrators manage 
outward and pursue boundary work: protect their organizations’ autonomy, build support, 
procure resources, take advantage of partnerships, co-produce results, engage in external politics, 
reduce uncertainty, limit potentially hostile forces, and overcome obstacles (Meier and O'Toole 
2003; Moore 1995; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Yan and Louis, 1999). Similarly, studies on 
collaborative and network management document managers’ involvement in initiation, execution 
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and assessment of joint programs and development of joint rules with the external actors 
(Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Berry et al. 2004; Bryson, Crosby and Stone 2006; Thomson and 
Perry 2006). Nursing home administrators, similar to other public managers, report spending a 
considerable amount of time dealing with external issues (Castle, Ferguson and Hughes 2009).  
Finally, innovation management, especially relevant to the context of this study, may 
affect organizational performance.  Innovation is a process of changing the established 
organizational objectives and structures, and how new ideas and practices spread and are 
“reinvented” throughout social systems has received considerable attention in social science 
research (Rogers 2003; 2004). Management is viewed as critical in the implementation of 
innovation (Berry 1994; Gabris, Grenell, Ihrke and Kaatz 1999; Stewart and Kringas 2003). In 
networked environments, innovation management is multi-pronged: it involves attending to new 
information, linking actors, reducing complexity, altering preferences, shifting structures, and 
building norms (O’Toole 1997). Increasingly, managers innovate by tailoring actions to the 
context (Ortt and van der Duin 2008). In nursing home care, leaders pursuing innovations lower 
costs and address organizational flaws (Deutschman 2005). The use of new technology (such as 
medication distribution technology) was found to enhance performance by helping to detect 
errors and build patient-focused care (Baril, Gascon and Brouillette 2014). The managers’ role is 
important in nursing homes, since nursing home employees are somewhat unfavorable to cultural 
change (Palmer et al. 2013). We include measures of sharing power, innovation, and external 
management to explore their effect on care quality and access.  
Other Factors Related to Performance. In addition to management, other organizational 
and environmental factors are related to performance.  Organizational ownership plays a central 
role:  theories suggest that public, nonprofit and for-profit sectors play different roles in the 
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society and pursue different outcomes (Allison 1982; Rainey, Backoff and Levine 1976). While 
private organizations are expected to have greater efficiency, less red tape and politics, they are 
less likely to prioritize legal and political responsiveness (Cohen 2001). Contract failure theory 
suggests that in markets with notable informational asymetries, public and nonprofit 
organizations outperform for-profit firms because they do not distribute profits to organizational 
owners (Hansmann 1987).  In health care, public and nonprofit organizations are expected to be 
more patient- and quality-centered, while for-profits are mainly concerned with cost 
minimization (Eggleston and Zeckhauser 2002). While nonprofits are instrumental in serving the 
needs of those different from the average voter, the government sector often steps in when 
voluntary organizations fail and when equality of consumption is critical (Eggleston and 
Zeckhauser 2002; Hansmann 1996; Salamon 1987). 
Empirical research on public-private differences is mixed, with some evidence of private 
sector superiority in cost minimization (Hodge 2000; Rainey and Chun 2005).  As shown below, 
in nursing care, public and nonprofit homes deliver better quality of care than for-profits.  When 
the direct measures of management are lacking, ownership is often used as a proxy for different 
management strategies. This article re-examines the effect of organizational ownership, after 
separating out the effect of three management variables.  Recognizing the importance of 
multivariate analysis that controls for location and adjusts for environmental risks (Smith 2006), 
we include other independent variables such as staffing, size, occupancy, affiliation with a 
hospital, changes in ownership, organizational age, market competition, number of hospitals, 
home health agencies and hospices in the county, population density, percent of elderly, whites, 
and those in poverty. We discuss these factors in more detail below.  
The Context of Nursing Home Care.  As a result of increasing longevity and decreasing 
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fertility in the U.S., the quality of long-term care is a salient public policy issue (Government 
Accountability Office 2015; Kinsella and Velkoff 2001; Thomas 2014).  Nursing homes are an 
important element of the contemporary long-term care systems. These are residences that 
provide room, meals, and assistance with activities of daily living to individuals with complex 
chronic care needs.  Most nursing homes in the U.S. are for-profit (approximately 65%), 
followed by nonprofit and public homes (28% and 7%, respectively) (Amirkhanyan et al. 2008).  
The industry can be characterized by a high degree of publicness for two reasons.10  First, 
federal, state, and local governments are direct providers of nursing care.  Originating from 
public almshouses, nursing homes were created to serve the veterans, elderly, and disabled 
indigent individuals. While the Medicaid and Medicare programs incentivized private providers 
to enter the market, numerous governments continued to operate nursing homes (Amirkhanyan 
2007; 2008; 2009). Second, federal, state, and local governments are involved in financing and 
regulating nursing homes. Nursing home care is fairly costly (Levit et al. 2000). According to the 
Nursing Home Compare (NHC) data used in this study, in 2012, care received by 60% of nursing 
home residents was reimbursed by Medicaid, while 16% were reimbursed by Medicare, and 25% 
had private long-term care insurance or paid out-of-pocket.11 To be eligible for federal funds, 
nursing homes must comply with federal and state mandates set forth by the Social Security Act 
and the Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 (Kane 1998). The CMS establishes the federal 
guidelines, while the states enforce them through licensure and inspections. The choice of clients 
                                                          
10 Following Bozeman, in this context, we use the concept of publicness that goes beyond organizations’ legal status, 
but incorporates broader factors, such as the oversight of political actors, and influence of the public and other 
stakeholders (Bozeman 1987; 2013). As elaborated above, both public and private nursing homes are financed by 
federal government programs and closely regulated by state government regulators.  
11 The Veteran's Administration nursing home operations account for a small portion of the 25% of residents not 
covered by Medicaid and Medicare (Thomas, n.d.).  However, we were not able to find any sources specifying the 
exact share for this market.  
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by providers, however, is not regulated in private homes (Freeman 2000). The latter motivates 
our focus to examine access to care as a dimension of performance.  
Theories of nursing home markets suggest key differences across ownership (Davis 1993; 
Scanlon 1980). The traditional assumptions of supply and demand do not work here due to the 
lack of consumer knowledge, minimal movement across providers, and third party payments. 
This results in informational asymmetries and limits the effect of reputation.  As a result, for-
profit “Medicaid mills” serve poorer, sicker and less informed clients and divert resources away 
from services (Castle and Shea 1998; Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo and 
Himmelstein 2001; Lemke and Moos 1989).  Meanwhile, nonprofit providers tend to cultivate 
quality, which helps attract more informed, affluent clients.  Nonprofit homes have better 
physical environment, equipment, and resident control; they evoke fewer complaints and 
deficiencies (O’Neill, Harrington, Kitchener and Saliba 2003; Santerre and Vernon 2005).  In 
summary, in the private sector, attainment of quality and access is a zero-sum game.  A small 
number of public homes have the safety-net role while providing high quality care 
(Amirkhanyan et al. 2008).   
While data on regulatory violations (or deficiencies) and staffing levels have been 
publicly available for decades, more recently, in an effort to simplify these indicators, five-star 
ratings of quality were developed (CMS n.d.a) based on a complex formula using data on 
staffing, regulatory violations, and other factors (Thomas 2014). Similar to other government 
inspections, nursing home inspections and star-ratings combine both archival (regulatory) and 
perceptual (observation-based and self-reported) data (Andrews et al. 2006b).12  
                                                          
12 The neutrality and unbiased nature of nursing home performance ratings created by the CMS may be undermined 
by several factors. First, performance assessment has high financial stakes: this marketplace is fairly litigious, and 
insurers may consider facility ratings during referrals. These pressures could produce perverse incentives for 
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Hypotheses.  This study examines the relationship of management, ownership, and other 
organizational factors to nursing home quality and access for Medicaid-funded clients. Existing 
research on nursing home quality has been primarily based on archival data with no management 
controls.13 Research on “best practices” in nursing care provides limited evidence on the central 
role of management (Compas, Hopkins and Townsley 2008). As noted in the introduction, our 
study contributes to the nursing home care literature by examining the effect of three distinct 
management practices and other factors on numerous measures of care quality and access. The 
quality of care is a fairly straightforward aspect of performance: higher care quality denotes 
better performance.  Consistent with the past research, we propose the following hypotheses on 
how three management strategies relate to care quality.  
H1: Shared decision-making in organizational management will be associated with improved 
care quality. 
H2: Managers’ focus on external influences will be associated with improved care quality. 
H3: Innovation management will be associated with improved care quality. 
Access to care is more mutifaceted.14  From the administrators’ perspective, higher 
dependence on Medicaid as a payment source means a facility is more resource poor, since 
Medicaid often fall short of covering the costs of care (Angelelli et al. 2003). We hypothesize 
that administrators who pursue the three managerial strategies under consideration will ensure 
lower rates of Medicaid admissions:  
H4: Shared decision-making in organizational management will be associated with lower 
Medicaid admissions. 
H5: Managers’ focus on external influences will be associated with lower Medicaid admissions. 
                                                          
cheating and goal displacement (Thomas 2014). Also, the field is highly political, being influenced by consumer 
demands to improve care and the industry’s attempt to minimize regulation (Edelman, 1997-1998).  
13 These studies suggest that staffing and nonprofit ownership are associated with fewer regulatory violations, while 
rural location, chain affiliation, size, competition, payment constraints, and percentage of clients on Medicaid are 
associated with more violations (Amirkhanyan 2008; Townsley, Bech and Pepper 2013; Harrington et al. 2001). 
14 Low-income community members may have a favorable view of higher Medicaid census in local nursing homes. 
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H6: Innovation management will be associated with lower Medicaid admissions. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data.  We used data from three sources. The NHC is the official public dataset generated 
by the CMS (CMS, n.d.b) created as a part of the quality assessment and certification process of 
all Medicaid or Medicare certified providers. State governments enforce national quality 
standards using trained inspectors who conduct nursing home site visits every nine to fifteen 
months. The team evaluates a nursing home’s compliance with over 180 federal and state 
regulatory standards in the following categories: quality of care, resident behavior and facility 
practices, resident assessment, resident rights, physical environment, dietary services, pharmacy 
services, and administration and regulation.15  To verify compliance, state inspectors review 
clinical and staffing records and interview residents, family members, and staff. A violation 
identified during a health inspection is recorded as a “health deficiency.”  
While having perceptual and internal components, NHC is “archival” data: the inspectors 
are external and are, to the extent possible, detached from the facilities. The inspections are 
based on a comprehensive tool applied in a standard fashion.16  The data are subject to review 
and appeal and considered an accurate and reliable indicator by scholars (Harrington et al. 2001).  
NHC is unbalanced facility-inspection level panel data. We have several observations pertaining 
to each facility, the most recent of which is related to the latest inspection conducted as of 
01/01/2014 (i.e., 9-15 months prior to that date). The panel that we used (N=15,695) contains all 
Medicare and Medicaid certified nursing homes in the U.S. This dataset was merged with the 
                                                          
15 For a complete listing and explanation of these deficiencies, see CMS (2015a). 
16 Like any inspection-based data, NHC has perceptual components. Inspectors may have ties with certain homes 
which may influence their assessments. Client and family interviews are also perceptual. Some data used for the 5-
star ratings are self-reported by nursing homes and are therefore less independent. Star ratings are based on three 
components: health inspections conducted by outside reviewers, as well as self-reported data on staffing and on 
eleven different physical and clinical measures of residents’ experience (CMS 2015b; Thomas 2014). 
16 
 
Texas A&M University (TAMU) Nursing Home Administrator (NHA) Survey, the second 
source of data used in this study (Compton, Calderon & Meier, 2013).  
The TAMU NHA Survey was implemented between 01/2013 and 05/2013. The dates 
match well with the NHC data.  The Survey was administered to all presently operating 
governmental nursing homes (n=903), and a random sample of 1000 for-profit and 1000 
nonprofit homes.  We oversampled public homes comprising a small share of the nursing home 
industry.  A total of 725 administrators responded to the survey in three waves, with a response 
rate of 25%.17 After removing six duplicate records, the number of surveys was 716. 18  As 
shown in Appendix A, our sample is similar to the population in terms of key characteristics 
tabulated by sector: number of beds, number of residents, percentage residents on Medicaid, 
nursing staff hours, hospital affiliation and both archival measures of quality. Our sample is 
somewhat more likely to include better performing facilities, which has implications for the 
generalizability of our findings (see the Discussion section). Appendix A suggests that, despite 
its modest response rate, our sample is representative of the nursing home population. All fifty 
states and the District of Columbia were represented both in the fielded sample (2,903 homes) 
and the final sample (716 homes).  
Finally, we used the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF) of the U.S. Bureau of Health 
Professionals. It includes county-level demographic and socio-economic data as well as 
information on the prevalence of health care organizations, by county.  
Dependent Variables: Quality and Access.  We use two alternative archival measures of 
nursing home quality.  The first measure is total number of health deficiencies identified during a 
                                                          
17 The response rate is 20.1% for for-profit, 25.4% for nonprofit and 28.9% for government nursing homes. Our 
overall response rate compares favorably to a recent nursing home survey in the Netherlands (22%) reported by Van 
Eijk and Steen (2015) 
18  Duplicate records occurred as a result of respondents’ filling out both the online and hard copy of the survey.  
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single inspection cycle. It includes both the deficiencies identified during a standard inspection 
and those identified due to a formal complaint by a party and verified by state surveyors.  While 
theoretically this measure can range between 0 and 188, in our sample, the range was 0 to 31 
(mean = 6).19 A large body of health policy literature has used and validated health deficiencies 
as a measure of nursing home quality (O'Neill et al. 2003). The second archival measure of 
quality is the overall 5-star rating, based on a formula incorporating: (a) 5-star health inspection 
rating, reflecting health deficiencies during the past three years, with recent results weighted 
more heavily; (b) 5-star staffing rating adjusted for the residents’ needs; and (c) 5-star quality 
rating, reflecting the patients’ clinical data. While used in the academic literature, the 5-star 
rating has received criticism due to its provider-reported components (Thomas 2014).  In our 
sample, the correlation coefficient between the health deficiencies and the overall 5-star rating is 
-0.52 (5-star rates quality, while deficiencies rate a lack of quality).20 As a supplemental measure 
of quality – perceived nursing home quality – we used six items from the TAMU NHA Survey.  
In the regression, we used the factor score for this measure. 21  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (Response categories: 
strongly agree (4), agree (3), disagree (2) and strongly disagree (1)).  
1. Our nursing provides outstanding quality of care. 
2. Our facility ensures a clean, safe, home-like and comfortable physical environment.  
3. Our nursing home is known for ensuring that the residents’ rights are always respected. 
4. Our nursing home is known for providing choices to the residents and satisfying their 
preferences.  
5. My nursing home meets the needs of the community it serves. 
6. This nursing home is considered to be one of the best of its type in the state. 
 
                                                          
19 Most homes have few violations:  10% of inspections had 0 violations, 50% had < 5, and 90% had < 12. 
20 In the population, this coefficient is -0.54, and in the fielded sample, it is -0.56. 
21 Factor analysis suggested using all six items in a single scale was appropriate. Following the Guttman-Kaiser rule, 
only Factor1 Eigenvalue was above one (2.96), suggesting one factor should be retained. All factors have moderate 
to high loadings in Factor 1 (for Item1=.75; item2=.70; Item3=.70; Item4=.68; Item5=.65; Item6=.72). The 
Cronbach’s alpha is 0.79. A predicted score generated from on factor loadings was used as a dependent variable.  
18 
 
We used several measures of access reflecting a home’s propensity to serve financially 
disadvantaged clients.  Percent residents on Medicaid22 was obtained by the authors from the 
CMS. Nursing homes with a higher share of residents on Medicaid are argued to be resource 
poor due to lower reimbursement-to-cost ratios (Castle 2005, 64; The Lewin Group 2002). This 
measure has been used in the literature (see Amirkhanyan 2008; Amirkhanyan et al. 2008).23  
We also use four perceptual measures of access from the TAMU NHA Survey.  First, variable 
self-reported percent residents on Medicaid was created:  
“Please, specify the percentage of all residents in your nursing home whose care is 
currently funded by the Medicaid program, Medicare program, or other sources of 
payment (e.g., out-of-pocket pay or private insurance).   
% residents on Medicaid: _______.”  
 
The correlation coefficient between this measure and the “archival” measure is 0.8, which 
may suggest recall problems or fluctuation of residents on Medicaid.   We also used these three 
variables (with strongly agree (4), agree (3), disagree (2) and strongly disagree (1) categories):  
1. Some cannot afford staying here (Survey item: “Some of our residents have to look 
for another nursing home because they cannot afford staying here”);  
2. Difficulty serving the uninsured (Survey item: “Our nursing home has difficulty 
admitting or serving uninsured clients”);  
3. Difficulty serving clients on Medicaid (Survey item: “Our nursing home has difficulty 
admitting and serving residents funded by the Medicaid program”).  
 
Independent Variables: Organizational Management.  We created three measures 
reflecting nursing home administrators’ management strategies based on the TAMU NHA 
Survey. First, variable sharing power reflects the administrator’s propensity to involve other 
stakeholders in decision-making. It is the average of the three items (with strongly agree (4), 
agree (3), disagree (2) and strongly disagree (1) response categories):24  
                                                          
22 As opposed to Medicare, private long-term care insurance or private-pay. 
23 It is also similar to the one used by Harrington Meyer (2001), who used Medicaid to private pay ratio in the 
facility as a measure of access. 
24 Correlation coefficients suggest moderate positive associations between three variables. The Cronbach’s alpha is 
0.7429, which supports the idea of a single latent factor. In the factor analysis of three items, following the Guttman-
19 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
1. I involve nursing and other non-managerial staff in my nursing home’s decision-
making process. 
2. Residents’ and families’ feedback and outcomes are taken into consideration when 
revising policies. 
3. Non-manager feedback is taken into consideration when revising policies. 
 
Second, innovation reflects a nursing home administrator’s propensity to look for and adopt new 
ideas or practices.  This measure is the average of three items:25 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
1. Our nursing home is always among the first to adopt new technology and practices. 
2. We continually search for new opportunities to provide services to our community.  
3. Our nursing home is always among the first to adopt new ideas and practices.  
Third, managing external influences reflects an administrator’s strategies focusing on external 
influences. We use the average of the following four items:26  
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
1. My role is to respond to various events and disturbances in the external environment of 
our nursing home.  
2. I always try to limit the influence of external events on the staff and nurses. 
3. I strive to control those factors outside the nursing home that could have an effect on my 
organization. 
4. Our nursing home emphasizes the importance of learning from the experience of others.27 
Ownership and Other Independent Variables. Two nominal variables indicate 
ownership status: nonprofit nursing home and public nursing home (NHC). For-profit ownership 
                                                          
Kaiser rule, only Factor1 has the Eigenvalue greater than one (1.98315), suggesting that one factor should be 
retained. All factors have moderate to high loadings in Factor 1 (factor loadings for Item1=.77; item2=.84; 
Item3=.83). Independent variables representing this and other management strategies represent averages of items 
included in the scale. 
25 Correlation matrix between three variables suggest moderate to strong positive associations. The Cronbach’s 
alpha is 0.81, supporting the idea of a single latent factor. Following the Guttman-Kaiser rule, only Factor1 has the 
Eigenvalue greater than one (2.17731), suggesting that one factor should be retained. All factors have moderate to 
high loadings in Factor 1 (factor loadings for Item1=.86; item2=.80; Item3=.90).  
26 The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.59. Following the Guttman-Kaiser rule, only Factor1 has the Eigenvalue 
greater than one (1.82661), suggesting that one factor should be retained. All factors have moderate to high loadings 
in Factor 1 (factor loadings for Item1=.59; item2=.67; Item3=.81; Item4=.62).  
27 To maximize our sample size, we imputed the mean for the missing values of all items comprising these three 
management scales. For the three items comprising the “sharing power” scale, percentage of missing cases was 
2.38% (item1); 2.38% (item2); and 2.24% (item3).  For the three items comprising the “innovation management” 
scale, percentage of missing cases was 2.38% (item1); 2.38% (item2); and 12.03% (item3).   For the four items 
comprising the “external management” scale, percentage of missing cases was as follows: 3.36% (item1); 3.64% 
(item2); 3.5% (item3), and 12.4% (item4).   
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is the omitted category in all regressions. The variable number of certified beds reflects nursing 
home’s size (NHC).   Number of residents reflects the number of clients in a nursing home 
(NHC).  To measure staffing, we use total nurse hours per resident per day including registered, 
vocational nurse and nurse aide hours (NHC). Hospital affiliated home reflects affiliation with a 
hospital (1=yes, 0=no) (NHC).   Change of owner indicates whether a facility changed its owner 
within 12 months (yes = 1, no= 0) (NHC).   We use a proxy variable years since certification to 
measure facility’s age (NHC).28  For competition, we use the Herfindahl index (Angelelli et al. 
2003; Castle 2005): the sum of squared market share percentages (#beds) for all nursing homes 
in a county, varying between zero and one (NHC).29  Finally, seven county-level measures were 
created from the AHRF data. Population density per square mile (in 1000s) reflects urbanicity, 
identified as a key predictor of quality. We also include percent in poverty (below the poverty 
line), percent elderly (65+), and percent White. Three variables account for alternative medical 
providers: number of home health agencies, number of hospices and number of hospitals in the 
county.  
Regression Analysis. We use multiple regression analysis to estimate several “quality” 
and “access” models.  In the general form, the models are as follows:    
Quality Model 
Q2013-2012 = 0 + 1M2013-2012  + 2N2011-2010  + 3P2011-2010  + 4A2011-2010  + 5X2011-2010 + e1  
  Access Model 
A2013-2012  =0 + 1M2013-2012 + 2N2011-2010  + 3P2011-2010 + 4Q2011-2010   + 5X2011-2010  + e2 
 
where Q = quality, A = access, M=management, N = nonprofit ownership, P = public ownership, and X = controls. 
 
 
                                                          
28 This is an imperfect proxy, as some facilities undergo organizational changes associated with a loss and/or more 
recent reacquisition of Medicare and/or Medicaid certification. 
29 This index approaches the value of 1 for the least competitive markets with a dominant provider, and zero – for 
the most competitive and least concentrated markets, with numerous providers that have similar market shares.   
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The dependent variables are the most recent survey record as of 01/2014, i.e., 2013 and late 2012 
survey cycles. The independent variables pertain to one of the previous survey’s cycles between 
2011 and 2010.  Since the TAMU NHA Survey was administered in 2012-2013, all management 
variables are contemporaneous with the dependent variables.30   
We use two alternative regression models to examine the total number of health 
deficiencies. First, we use OLS with robust standard errors (to address heteroscedasticity) and 
state fixed effects (to alleviate interdependency of observations at the state level). Second, we 
use a Negative Binomial (NB) model with state fixed effects. The dependent variable – total 
number of health deficiencies – is a positive count with a positively skewed Poisson 
distribution.31 In the second archival quality model the dependent variable, overall 5-star rating, 
is ordinal. We used ordered logit with state fixed effects. For the perceptual quality model 
(perceived nursing home quality), we use OLS with robust standard errors and state fixed effects. 
The individual factor scores used as a dependent variable reflect individual nursing homes’ 
placement on an underlying factor of “perceived quality.”  In the archival access model 
(%residents on Medicaid), we use OLS with robust standard errors and state fixed effects.   We 
also ran four perceptual access models. OLS is used for self-reported percent on Medicaid.  For 
the remaining three perceptual measures of access (some cannot afford staying here, difficulty 
serving the uninsured and difficulty serving clients on Medicaid), we use ordered logit.  
FINDINGS 
                                                          
30 In the AHRF, percent elderly, percent in poverty, number of home health agencies and number of hospices in all 
models were for 2011, while population density, number of hospitals and percent white were for 2010. 
31 We first ran the Poisson regression and examined the goodness of fit. The Pearson chi-square and deviance were 
greater than one and indicated over-dispersion which violates the assumption of equality of the mean and the 
variance of the dependent variable imposed by the Poisson model.  NB model accommodates overdispersion by 
including a random term reflecting unexplained between-subject differences (Gardner, Mulvey, and Shaw 1995).   
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Summary statistics for all variables are in Table 1. Table 2 presents the quality models. 
We first examine the findings on archival measures: the total number of health deficiencies and 
the 5-star rating. We find no support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 3 is confirmed: 
innovation management – perceived and self-reported search for and adoption of new 
technologies, ideas, and practices – is associated with a significant reduction in the number of 
deficiencies in both models. In the fixed effects model, the slope is -1.26.  It is also associated 
with an increase in the overall 5-star rating.  With a one-point increase in innovation levels, a 
nursing home’s ordered log-odds of being in a higher five-star rating category would increase by 
0.31, while keeping other variables constant. External management and sharing power are not 
significant. Additionally, public and nonprofit nursing homes perform significantly better than 
their for-profit counterparts. They have fewer health deficiencies and a higher 5-star rating. In 
the fixed effects models, public and nonprofit homes have fewer violations than for-profit 
facilities by 1.8 and 1.7, respectively (sig. <0.001).  In the nursing home context, these 
differences are practically important: a single violation may reflect a breach of a regulatory code 
related to patient quality of life or care, triggering repeat inspections, fines, and lawsuits.  
Consistent with the past research, larger nursing homes have more deficiencies and lower 
star ratings. Meanwhile, occupancy is associated with fewer deficiencies.  As the percentage of 
clients on Medicaid increases, the number of deficiencies increases as well, while the overall 5-
star rating significantly decreases (but the magnitude is negligible).  Finally, higher population 
density is associated with fewer health deficiencies and higher star rating. 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Our secondary goal was to compare the findings across archival and perceptual measures 
of performance. The perceptual model is only partially consistent with the archival findings. All 
23 
 
management variables are associated with higher perceived quality. This enhanced estimation of 
management effect likely suggests common source bias. Public (but not nonprofit) administrators 
had significantly more positive perceptions of their homes’ performance than for-profit 
administrators. Our findings related to size, occupancy, density, and percentage of Medicaid 
residents mirror the archival models. Two variables are only significant in the perceptual model: 
perceived quality declines with organizational age and in counties with lower poverty rate. 
The findings on access are presented in Table 3.  In the archival model, two management 
variables are significant. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, nursing homes where administrators report 
sharing power (i.e., taking into consideration others’ feedback) have a higher percentage of 
residents on Medicaid (the magnitude is 5.1). We find no evidence of external management 
being associated with lower access, as Hypothesis 5 suggested. Supporting Hypothesis 6, with 
90% confidence, as innovation increases, percent residents on Medicaid decreases by 3 
percentage points. Nonprofit nursing homes have a significantly lower percentage of residents on 
Medicaid (with a sizeable 10 percentage-point magnitude) compared to for-profit homes. 
Additionally, as facility age increases, the Medicaid percentage goes up.  Staffing is significantly 
lower in facilities with more Medicaid residents. Finally, as the poverty rate and market 
competition increase, so does the percent residents on Medicaid.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Our findings in the perceptual access models are mixed. Respondents in the TAMU NHA 
Survey were asked to report the current percentage of facility residents on Medicaid. The 
findings are similar to those in the archival model with two exceptions: management strategies as 
well as competition are not significant. The remaining three perceptual models of access are less 
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informative.32  Two models suggest that using power-sharing strategies are associated with 
limited access for low-income clients. Also, administrators in public and nonprofit nursing 
homes are significantly less likely to report that their clients cannot afford staying in their 
facilities or that their homes have difficulty serving the uninsured and Medicaid-funded clients.   
DISCUSSION 
This study examines the effect of three management strategies – innovation, shared 
decision-making, and management of external influences – and other organizational and 
environmental factors on numerous measures of service quality and access in U.S. nursing 
homes.  Innovation management is associated with significantly fewer health violations assigned 
by state inspectors and higher facilities’ star ratings.  Further, innovative management strategies 
also appear to be positively related to a nursing home’s ability to fill their beds with non-
Medicaid clients, thus limiting access of low-income or impoverished clients. These findings are 
tied to the nature of the nursing home industry. Innovation management reflects the managers’ 
propensity to adopt new facility designs, search for new service opportunities, and adopt new 
ideas, care practices, and technologies. These practices can contribute to the formalization of 
cutting-edge professional practices that help achieve greater efficiency, improve the quality of 
care, and reduce the likelihood of violations. These findings are supported by the health care 
literature on the use of new technologies and their effect on overall organizational performance 
(Baril et al. 2014). Furthermore, in competitive markets, facilities compete for non-Medicaid 
clients, whose cost-to-reimbursement ratios are attractive for providers.  The focus on innovation 
may result in a competitive advantage, enhancing the facility’s reputation, and attracting 
healthier, more informed and affluent clients. 
                                                          
32 To improve the fit of these models, we ran simple ordered logit, without controlling for state fixed effects.   
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Shared decision-making and external management are not associated with service quality.  
These findings also reflect the context of nursing home care. Taking the time to inform and 
engage with internal and external stakeholders in decision-making may be viewed as time-
consuming and inconsistent with a management culture of “putting out fires.” A recent nursing 
home study indicates that top managers spend most of their time addressing facilities’ short-term, 
daily operational needs (Castle et al. 2009). Their behavior tends to be reactive: with short-term, 
rather than long-term agendas. Notably, more centralized (not shared) decision-making is 
associated with fewer Medicaid clients. The literature is mixed on the effect of distributed 
leadership in nursing homes (Deutschman 2005; Fitzgerald et al. 2013; Rondeau and Wagar 
2001; Tomlinson 2012). Our findings echo Deutschman’s (2005) that managers prioritize other 
factors (e.g., regulations or efficiency) over staff engagement and empowerment. Greater power 
sharing in homes with more Medicaid clients may suggest that in uncertain, cash-constrained 
environments, administrators tend to adopt relationship-oriented styles. With the modest 
significance levels in archival models, more research is needed to understand this relationship.  
Our findings on ownership are particularly interesting. After controlling for management, 
ownership in our models may be capturing management practices related to resource allocation 
and organizational priorities.  In the archival models, nonprofit and public ownership is 
associated with fewer violations and higher star ratings. Nonprofit homes also serve fewer 
Medicaid clients. These findings are consistent with the theories of nursing home ownership and 
performance. Informational asymmetries and limited Medicaid reimbursements determine what 
appears to be a zero-sum game between quality and access in the private sector. These findings 
are also consistent with the evidence in the broader organizational management literature 
suggesting that organizations often pursue conflicting priorities. The for-profit homes are 
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incentivized to divert revenues away from quality, while serving older and more disabled 
Medicaid-funded clients.  Meanwhile, the nonprofit homes, a quarter of the industry, cultivate 
quality by targeting, marketing to, and admitting the more affluent private-pay, privately-insured, 
or Medicare clients.  The latter reflects nonprofits’ tendency towards philanthropic individualism 
and particularism – a propensity to focus on specific target groups, and seek to satisfy their needs 
irrespective of efficiency considerations (Salamon 2002; Steinberg 2006). Government providers 
appear to prioritize both dimensions of performance. Importantly, past service to the Medicaid 
clients is associated with the future prevalence of health deficiencies as well as the star ratings, 
suggesting that lower revenues undermine future quality.   
We supplement our analysis with perceptual measures. In the quality models, all 
management variables are significant and positive. These findings likely reflect common source 
bias – the administrators’ propensity to favorably report on their practices and successes (Boyne 
et al. 2006; Meier and O’Toole 2013a). The bias is less likely to affect the access measures, since 
the difficulty serving the uninsured is unlikely to be thought of as a measure of success by the 
administrators, who are often financially rewarded for Medicare admissions.  Despite some 
consistency across the archival and perceptual models, some counterintuitive findings in the 
perceptual models, such as higher perceived quality in less affluent areas, support the idea that 
these results may be an artifact of omitted variable bias (Meier and O’Toole 2013a).  
Additional discrepancies related to the effect of ownership on performance are notable, 
consistent with past research (Amirkhanyan et al. 2014; Shingler et al. 2008). Theoretically, 
perceptual measures should correlate with the archival indicators that managers carefully track. 
Yet the nonprofits’ subjective assessments of quality are not significantly different from those in 
the for-profit sector.  Meanwhile, public-sector administrators are in fact reporting higher 
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perceived quality than those in the for-profit facilities.   Similar differences are present for access 
to care. While aware of the extent of service to Medicaid recipients, public and nonprofit 
administrators’ responses to the more general questions about access diverge from these 
findings. Perhaps, reflective of their social missions, nonprofits report providing better access to 
the uninsured and Medicaid clients compared to for-profits. Public-sector administrators may 
perceive their homes as a “safety net” in comparison to their for-profit counterparts, despite the 
fact that their Medicaid admissions are in fact not different from those in the for-profit sector. 
Even though our measures are fairly specific and meet the general conditions for comparability 
with the archival measures, we observe discrepancies in terms of the relationship between 
various factors and the archival and perceptual measures. While the formal indicators are widely 
available, they do not directly inform the managers’ perceptions of quality and access. Consistent 
with the literature on perceptual measures of performance, our findings suggest that relying 
exclusively on the internal stakeholders’ assessments– in this context or in the broader 
organizational management literature – is insufficient to understand the scope and the sources of 
improvements.  
Some additional findings merit attention to help understand the sources of improvement 
in organizational performance. Consistent with the argument that resources are the most likely 
sources of performance improvements, having more non-Medicaid clients (and hence, higher 
revenues) is associated with fewer violations and higher star ratings. The effect of population 
density suggests that higher care quality is harder to achieve in less populated areas. 
Additionally, consistent with the past nursing home care literature, larger nursing homes provide 
lower quality of care. Smaller nursing homes may be more effective at creating unique 
environments and personalizing care for their residents (Amirkhanyan 2008).  
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We reflect upon our use of hybrid data, its merits and limits. The key advantage, as noted 
earlier, is in connecting “the black box” of management and the richness of the internal 
organizational context to the performance data generated in a standardized fashion by 
independent stakeholders (Boyne et al. 2006). The TAMU NHA Survey was designed and 
administered after a carefully considering the archival measures of the NHC data, resulting in 
perceptual data tailored to the archival data.33 Clearly, primary data collection may not always be 
feasible or may present selection challenges due to lower response rates. Merging two secondary 
data sets into a hybrid data set, in turn, may present its own unique challenges.  
We note several limitations of this study. Our findings suggest that the policy context is 
key in understanding what strategies are related to performance. This study is conducted in a 
market with high asset specificity, dependent clientele, extensive government subsidies and 
regulation, and relatively low service measurability. The use of formal long-term care is higher 
in countries and communities with a higher employment rate, higher job-related mobility, better 
retirement benefits, and, therefore, higher prevalence of nuclear families.  Our findings on 
management, thus, may be more generalizable to similar markets34 and less generalizable to 
other policy fields.   
                                                          
33 The TAMU NHA Survey, administered by the authors of this study, includes perceptual measures of performance 
developed to (1) be specific in referring to various aspects of performance, and (2) generally reflect the archival 
measures included in the NHC data to allow us to compare results across measures. Thus, the NHC data set includes 
information on the percentage of residents receiving Medicaid. In the NHA Survey, we also asked respondents for 
the same information. (Additionally, we asked three alternative questions on access). The regulatory violations in 
the NHC data are based on various mandates pertaining, broadly, to quality of care, resident behavior and facility 
practices, resident rights, physical environment, and others. The subjective nursing home performance scale in the 
NHA Survey includes several (albeit, limited, by virtue of survey length limitations) questions touching upon 
several key categories of care quality, facility condition, residents’ rights, and others. 
34 These may include fields such as substance abuse, mental health, or developmental disabilities services, family-
centered social services, child care, or home health care. Nonetheless, important differences across these fields 
should not be disregarded. None of these services require the level of technological and scientific sophistication 
prevalent in nursing homes. Their financing and regulation, mostly done through state and local government 
contracts and contract monitoring, is also quite different from the formal state inspection, licensure and 
reimbursement processes in nursing home care. 
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Furthermore, while our use of hybrid data helps avoid common source bias by using 
archival data along with perceptual managerial measures, the latter measures may be subject to 
positivity and social desirability bias.  The online/mail-in character of the TAMU NHA Survey 
may help minimize this concern.  Additionally, as noted earlier, our sample is more likely to 
include better performing facilities, and hence the effect of management that we observe may be 
more pronounced in those homes.  Finally, while we control for a wide range of factors typically 
included in the analysis of nursing home quality, we cannot exclude the possibility of omitted 
variable bias. Thus, we lack data on financial performance of nursing homes which would 
present additional interesting directions for this study. (The percentage of residents funded by 
Medicaid we include here could serve as an indirect measure of facility revenues.) 
Finally, we note two directions for further research. Boyne (2003) finds as an important 
source of public sector improvement – government regulation. While our current article uses two 
products of the regulatory process – deficiencies and star ratings – we do not directly consider 
the process of regulation and the administrators’ relevant experiences and perceptions (see 
Amirkhanyan, Meier and O’Toole 2017). The latter is extremely important in the heavily 
regulated U.S. nursing home context. Understanding how government regulation is perceived by 
public, nonprofit, and for-profit administrators and exploring the influence of these experiences 
and perceptions on the facilities’ performance may inform our understanding of how government 
quality assurance and assessment influence service quality.  
Furthermore, our perceptual measures of quality come from a single source – the nursing 
home administrators. Subjective assessments of organizational performance can come from 
numerous external and internal constituencies that are likely to have different needs and 
perspectives of the value of public services (Connolly, Conlon and Deutsch 1980). Thus, a more 
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comprehensive analysis of performance would incorporate other assessments, for instance those 
coming from the organizational clients. While we do not have data on client satisfaction, some 
NHC deficiencies are associated with client complaints. As a next step, we plan on exploring 
complaint-based violations and comparing them with those based on the standard facility surveys 
conducted by state inspectors.   
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Dependent and Independent Variables. Descriptive Statistics. 
Dependent Variables Mean St.D.  Min Max Obs 
Archival Quality Measures (NHC)      
Total number of health deficiencies 5.87 5.04 0 31 713 
Overall 5-star rating* 3.65 1.24 1 5 682 
Perceptual Quality Measures (TAMU Survey)      
Perceived nursing home quality  3.62 0.37 2.17 4 689 
Archival Access Measures (NHC)      
Percent residents on Medicaid 57.90 22.65 0 100 715 
Perceptual Access Measures (TAMU Survey)      
Self-reported percent residents on Medicaid  58.65 23.97 0 100 594 
Some cannot afford staying here**  1.83 0.90 1 4 692 
Difficulty serving the uninsured*** 1.65 0.79 1 4 699 
Difficulty serving clients on Medicaid**** 2.67 0.95 1 4 693 
      
Independent Variables           
Nonprofit nursing home  (NHC) 0.35 n/a 0.0 1.0 715 
Public nursing home  (NHC) 0.34 n/a 0.0 1.0 715 
Management: Sharing power (TAMU Survey) 3.46 0.45 2.0 4.0 715 
Management: Innovation  (TAMU Survey) 2.83 0.60 1.0 4.0 715 
Management: Managing ext. influences  (TAMU Survey) 3.00 0.42 1.8 4.0 715 
Number of certified beds  (NHC) 103.48 72.38 9.0 720.0 706 
Number of residents (NHC) 89.03 67.16 2.0 664.0 706 
Total nursing hours per resident per day  (NHC) 4.17 1.81 1.5 27.7 706 
Hospital affiliated home  (NHC) 0.11 n/a 0.0 1.0 706 
Change of owner during past 12 month (NHC) 0.03 n/a 0.0 1.0 706 
Years since certification  (NHC) 21.34 11.90 0.0 44.0 706 
Population density (in 1000s) per sq. mile (AHRF) 0.77 2.67 0.0 35.4 714 
Percent elderly (AHRF) 15.32 4.11 6.6 35.1 714 
Percent in poverty (AHRF) 15.59 5.31 4.0 41.8 714 
Number of home health agencies (AHRF) 19.08 79.88 0.0 677.0 714 
Number of hospices (AHRF) 3.70 9.20 0.0 113.0 714 
Number of hospitals (AHRF) 5.69 10.76 0.0 111.0 714 
Herfindahl index of competition (NHC) 0.29 0.29 0.0 1.0 708 
Percent White   (AHRF) 81.89 15.73 17.4 98.9 714 
*7% of nursing homes had a 1 star rating; 14%: 2 stars; 17%: 3 stars; 31%: 4 stars; 31%: 5 stars. 
**2.43% strongly agreed; 12.16% agreed, 33.19% disagreed and 52.22% strongly disagreed.   
***21.93% strongly agreed; 35.64% agreed, 30.30% disagreed and 12.12% strongly disagreed.  
****7.8% strongly agreed; 10.4% agreed, 39% disagreed and 42.77% strongly disagreed.  
Note 1. "NHC" Nursing Home Compare; "AHRF" Area Health Resource File.     
  Note 2.  While in the regression we use individual factor scores for perceived nursing home quality, in    
  Table 1, we report the more intuitively clear averages of items comprising each variable.
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Table 2. Quality Models: Measures from Archival and Perceptual Data. 
 
 
 
 
 
P E R C E P T U A L
b S.E. sig. b OR S.E. sig. b S.E. sig. b S.E. sig.
Nursing Home Variables
Nonprofit nursing home -1.70 0.45 *** -0.32 0.73 0.08 *** 0.98 0.20 *** 0.09 0.11
Public nursing home -1.84 0.52 *** -0.33 0.72 0.09 *** 0.81 0.21 *** 0.27 0.11 **
Management: Sharing power 0.61 0.43 0.09 1.09 0.07 0.24 0.18 0.22 0.07 ***
Management: Innovation -1.28 0.32 *** -0.22 0.81 0.05 *** 0.31 0.13 ** 0.52 0.05 ***
Management: External management -1.01 0.66 -0.11 0.90 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.32 0.09 ***
Number of certified beds 0.03 0.01 *** 0.01 1.01 0.00 ** -0.02 0.00 *** -0.01 0.00 ***
Number of residents -0.02 0.01 * 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 ** 0.01 0.00 ***
Total nursing hours per resident per day 0.03 0.14 0.01 1.01 0.02 0.08 0.06 -0.01 0.04
Percent residents on Medicaid 0.02 0.01 ** 0.00 1.00 0.00 ** -0.01 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 **
Hospital affiliated home -0.05 0.56 0.01 1.01 0.11 -0.12 0.27 0.17 0.11
Change of owner during past 12 month -0.70 0.93 -0.03 0.97 0.20 -0.06 0.49 -0.31 0.25
Years since certification 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 **
County-level Variables
Population density -0.15 0.06 ** -0.03 0.97 0.02 * 0.12 0.04 *** -0.01 0.01 **
Percent elderly -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.99 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
Percent in poverty 0.06 0.05 0.01 1.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 *
Herdindahl index of competition 1.32 0.79 0.23 1.26 0.14 0.01 0.36 -0.10 0.15
Intercept 8.67 2.50 *** -3.03 0.31 ***
N 703 703 672 679
R Square (or  Pseudo R Square) 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.21
Prob > F (or Chi Square) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: ***=sig <0.01; **=sig <0.05; * sig <0.1
A R C H I V A L
Total number of health deficiencies Overall 5-star 
rating
D.V.: Perceived 
nursing home quality
Independent Variables Fixed Effects 
Model
Negative Binomial Model Ordered Logit 
with state 
dummies
Fixed Effects Model
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Table 3. Access Models: Measures from Archival and Perceptual Data. 
 
 
b S.E. sig. b S.E. sig. b S.E. sig. b S.E. sig. b S.E. sig.
Nursing Home Variables
Nonprofit nursing home -10.10 1.86 *** -9.42 2.04 *** -0.49 0.20 ** -0.59 0.19 *** 0.30 0.19
Public nursing home -2.05 1.97 0.34 2.77 -0.81 0.21 *** -1.00 0.20 *** -0.56 0.21 ***
Management: Sharing power 3.22 1.70 * 1.98 1.91 -0.35 0.18 * -0.11 0.17 -0.53 0.18 ***
Management: Innovation -2.36 1.25 * -0.47 1.52 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.13
Management: External Management 1.40 1.95 1.77 2.55 -0.06 0.20 0.13 0.19 -0.24 0.20
Number of certified beds 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of residents -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Total nursing hours per resident per day -1.39 0.52 *** -2.33 0.47 *** 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
Total number of health deficiencies 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Hospital affiliated home -2.39 3.30 0.49 3.90 0.40 0.26 -0.02 0.24 -0.04 0.26
Change of owner during past 12 month -1.82 3.12 0.88 4.55 0.17 0.46 0.31 0.48 0.02 0.46
Years since certification 0.28 0.10 *** 0.22 0.11 ** 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
County-level Variables
Population density -0.67 0.41 -0.60 0.41 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.03 **
Percent elderly 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.34 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.02 **
Percent in poverty 0.94 0.21 *** 1.22 0.19 *** 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.02 ***
Number of home health agencies 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of hospices -0.06 0.30 -0.22 0.31 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 ** 0.00 0.02
Number of hospitals -0.04 0.33 -0.09 0.33 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Herfindahl index of competition 5.92 2.79 ** 1.47 4.02 0.39 0.31 0.19 0.31 0.29 0.32
Percent White 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Intercept 20.14 15.06 19.22 16.29
N 679 569 663 657 656
R Square (or Pseudo R Square) 0.20 0.21 0.03 0.03 0.04
Prob > F (or Chi Square) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Note 1: ***=sig <0.01; **=sig <0.05; * sig <0.1
Note 2: State dummies were not used in Ordered Logit models, as the fit of those models was qeustionable. 
A R C H I V A L P E R C E P T U A L  
Percent residents 
on Medicaid
Self-reported % 
residents on 
Some cannot afford 
staying here
Difficulty serving 
the uninsured
Difficulty serving 
clients on Medicaid
Ordered Logit Independent Variables Fixed Effects 
Model
Fixed Effects 
Model
Ordered Logit Ordered Logit 
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Appendix A.  
Comparison of All Operating US Nursing Homes to Our Sample.  
 
Variables For-profit Nonprofit Public For-profit Nonprofit Public
Percent residents on Medicaid (means) 63.2 49.0 62.1 62.4 50.3 62.0
Number of certified beds (means) 109.6 94.3 115.0 110.5 94.7 105.4
Number of residents (means) 89.2 81.2 95.0 91.5 83.2 90.0
Total nurse hours per resident per day (means) 3.9 4.5 4.5 3.9 4.4 4.5
Hospital affiliation (percent "affiliated") 1.1 14.5 26.2 0.9 12.4 19.6
Number of health deficiencies (means) 7.5 5.4 6.4 6.7 5.0 6.0
Overall 5-star rating (means) 3.2 3.8 3.6 3.2 4.0 3.7
Population (2013-2012 wave)  Sample (2013-2012 wave)
